




The Federal Reserve Board of
Governors has proposed
extending the present system of
reserve requirements to non-
member institutions-including
both banks and thrift institutions
-to the extent that such
institutions issue deposits that
perform any type of checking-
account function. This report
presents, in question-and-answer
form, a discussion of this subject.
It beoins with a summary of the
Federal Reserve proposals, fol-
lowed by some historical back-
ground and a discussion of the
monetary-policy uses of reserve
requirements. The report contin-
ues with an analysis of the Fed's
supporting arguments, and
concludes with a discussion of
some opposing views.
The basic function of reserve
requirements is to permit the
Federal Reserve to control the
supply of money and credit in
pursuit of its basic economic-
policy goals. Reserve require-
ments can influence the growth
of bank loans, investments and
deposits, and thus are an im-
portant element in the monetary-
control mechanism. To permit
proper central-bank management
of the supply of money and
credit, banking institutions
should meet their reserve re-
quirements by holding assets in a
form which is under the most
direct control of the Federal
Reserve. These assets could be
either vault cash (coins, Treasury
currency, Federal Reserve notes)
or deposits at the Reserve Banks.
This test cannot be met by
present state legislation. Under
such legislation, nonmember
banks may be subject to similar
percentage ratios but are not
required to hold reserves in the
form of deposits at Federal Re-
serve Banks; instead they may
hold those reserves in other
forms, such as correspondent
balances with other commercial
banks. When such reserves are
held at a member bank, that bank
naturally must support these
balances with its own reserves
consisting either of vault cash or
deposits at the Federal Reserve,
but the size of its cash reserves
will be only a fraction of the
initial deposit at the nonmember
bank.
With present differential reserve
requirements, therefore, shifts of
deposits between member and
nonmember ban ks alter the
quantity of deposits at all com-
mercial banks that can be sup-
ported by a given volume of bank
reserves. This factor tends to
loosen the links between bank
reserves and the money supply,
and weakens the Fed's control
over the monetary aggregates.
The problem is complicated by
the sharp fluctuations and rapidgrowth of nonmember-bank
deposits. Over the past decade,
nonmember banks have ac-
counted for roughly 40 percent
of the total rise in checking
deposits, but the proportion has
varied in individual years from as
low as one-tenth to as high as
three-fourths or more. Since
1960, moreover, the nonmember-
bank proportion of total demand
deposits has risen from 17 to
about 25 percent, and it may well
continue to rise.
The growing importance of non-
member banks mainly reflects
the competitive disadvantage
imposed on member banks by
requiring them to hold reserves
in the form of vault cash or as
deposits at the Federal Reserve.
Non-member banks, in contrast,
can utilize required reserves as
earning assets even when they
are held as demand balances
with other commercial banks,
since these balances also serve
as a form of payment for services
rendered by city correspondents.
As a consequence, banks gener-
ally have an incentive to avoid
membership in the Federal
Reserve System. Since 1960,
about 750 banks have left the
System through withdrawal or
mergers, and almost 1,800 newly
chartered state banks have re-
mained outside, compared with
less than 100 that elected System
membership. (Over the same
period, there have been about
870 newly chartered national
banks, and these automatically
have become Federal eserve
members.) The subject gains new
urgency because of the recent
efforts of nonbank deposit insti-
tutions to evolve new modes of
money transfer, since this factor
could further loosen the linkages




What is the Federal Reserve's
basic proposal?
The Federal Reserve proposes to
extend the present system of
reserve requirements to non-
member institutions, to the
extent that such institutions issue
deposits that perform any type
of checking-account function.
What types of deposits would be
included or excluded?
Reserve requirements would be
applied only to nonmember
accounts which are directly
employed in making money pay-
ments-that is to demand de-
posits and to time accounts with
negotiable third-party payment
features. The proposal would not
apply to nonmember time de-
posits other than negotiable
orders of withdrawal-NOW
accounts, that is, interest-bearing
deposits for which the depositor
can make withdrawals by negoti-
able or transferable instrument.
Regular time-and-savings de-
posits would not be included
because they are not highly active
deposits, although they do serve
a money-like function, to some
degree.
What would the new
requirements be?
The reserve-requirement range
would be between 5 and 22
percent for demand deposits,
with the specific figure deter-
mined, just as now, by the
Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors. (The present range is from
10 to 22 percent at reserve city
banks and from 7 to 14 percent at
other banks.) The range would be
between 3 and 20 percent of
NOW accounts. In addition, the
range for member-bank time-
and-savings deposits would be
changed from the present 3 to 10
percent, to a range of 1 to 10
percent.
What institutions would be
affected?
The proposal would apply to
commercial banks, of which
there are about 5,700 member
and 8,300 nonmember institu-
tions. It would also apply to
savings and other depository
institutions, along with foreign-
owned banking institutions that
19provide demand (checking ac-
count) deposits. The reserves
would be held in the form of
vault cash or non-interest-earning
deposits at the Federal Reserve.
The legislation would not require
System membership on the part
of present nonmember institu-
tions, nor would it make any
change in supervisory arrange-
ments.
What exemptions are included
in the proposal?
The draft legislation includes a
provision which effectively
exempts the first $2 million of net
demand deposits and NOW
accounts from reserve require-
ments. The average size of non-
member bank that would be
totally exempted would be about
$4 million, for total time and
demand accounts. Such institu-
tions number about 3,000, but
they hold only about 21/2 percent
of the nation's total demand
deposits. Altogether, about 62
percent of the present nonmem-
ber banks-over 5,000 banks in
all, controlling roughly 6 percent
of deposits-would be exempt
from any reserve requirements
that exceed their present vault-
cash holdings.
When would the new reserve
requirements be imposed?
To ease the transition, required
reserves would be phased in
gradually over a four-year period,
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on those deposits (over $2 mil-
lion) held at the time the law
goes into effect. The phase-in
would occur at the rate of 20
percent of the total requirement
per year, so that by the fifth year
each bank would be meeting its
full reserve requirement. How-
ever, any increase in deposits
over those existing at time of
enactment would be immediately
su bject to the fuII reserve re-
quirement.
What benefits would nonmember
institutions receive under the
Fed's proposal?
The legislation would permit
Federal Reserve credit to be
made available to any institutions
that maintain deposits with Re-
serve banks, subject to existing
Federal Reserve regulations.
Under present law, credit to non-
members is extended only in
highly unusual circumstances,
and under restrictive conditions
as to the type of collateral that
may be accepted by the Reserve
Bank. The proposed legislation
would give nonmember institu-
tions greater access to the Fed's
discount window, especially at




The legislation would require
reporting of deposit liabilities by
institutions (member and non-
member) that are subject to
reserve requirements set by the
Federal Reserve. This information,
which is needed for monitoring
purposes, would permit compar-
ative analysis of the various
financial institutions as the




What was the original purpose
of reserve requirements?
Before the Federal Reserve
System was founded, reserve
requirements were imposed by
legislation at the national and
state levels as a means of pro-
tecting bank liquidity. That
philosophy was reflected in the
original structure of reserve
requirements adopted by the
Federal Reserve.
Are reserve requirements still
used as a means of protecting
liquidity?
Req uired reserves are no longer
a source of operating liquidity,
except as they can be used within
the weekly reserve-accounting
period to absorb large fluctua-
tions in check clearings. Instead,-
..























Reserve requirements generally have trended






·Regulation 0 amendments (Nov. 1972) introduced graduated reserve requirements with
lower requirements for smaller categories of banks.
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What resources do banks have to
meet customer demands for
withdrawals?
Banks can draw on their liquid
assets; these include reserve-
account balances at the Fed held
in excess of requirements (with
the proviso noted above), plus
their own deposits at other banks
and readily marketable short-
term assets from their loan and
security portfolios. Additionally,
banks usually have other sources
of funds: from other banks in the
form of inter-bank loans, from
the public in the form of interest-
bearing CD's, and from the Fed
through the discount window if
they are Federal Reserve mem-
bers. (Nonmember banks may
the essential function of reserve
requirements today is to serve as
a fulcrum for monetary policy.
Paradoxically, the assets now
called "bank reserves" do not
serve as additional resources for
paying off withdrawals except in
a minor way. (They can furnish a
fraction of the funds needed,
depending on the reserve ratio;
for example, with a1a-percent
ratio, 1a percent of the funds are
provided through excess reserves
as required reserves fall.) On the
other hand, the additional re-
sources which banks actually
hold to meet withdrawals-their
reserves in a functional sense-
are not called reserves.
21borrow from the Fed only under
certain emergency provisions of
the Federal Reserve Act.)
What member-bank liabilities are
subject to reserve requirements?
Legal reserves are required
against the following member-
bank liabilities: net demand
deposits (gross demand deposits
less cash items in process of
collection and balances held with
other banks); savings deposits;
other time deposits, defined as
deposits maturing in 30 days or
more; liabilities to foreign
branches, borrowings from for-
eign banks, and assets acquired
by foreign branches from
their domestic offices; and
funds obtained by member banks
via the issuance of commercial
paper or similar obligations by
their affiliates.
What has been the historical
trend of reserve requirements?
Present reserve percentages have
evolved from about 40 separate
changes since the Federal Re-
serve System was established.
Perhaps by coincidence, today's
percentages are not greatly dif-
ferent from the original levels.
(Depending on size of bank,
requirements now range from 8
to 18 percent on demand de-
posits, and from 3 to 5 percent
on time deposits, while marginal
requirements of 8 percent are
imposed on large time deposits
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and related money-market in-
struments.) However, reserve
requirements generally have
trended downward over the past
twenty years. Since 1953, require-
ments on net demand deposits
have been reduced on balance by
about 6 percentage points for
both large and small banks.
Average requirements on time-
and-savings deposits are lower
now than twenty years ago, with
requirements on savings deposits
being at their statutory 3-percent
minimum (see chart).




was a holdover from the National
Banking Act, which viewed re-
quired reserves as a source of
liquidity. Interbank deposits were
extremely volatile and were con-
centrated in the larger cities, so
banks located there were subject
to the highest reserves. But with
the passage of time, this system
of reserve classification became
increasingly outmoded. Some
large banks in cities of substantial
size enjoyed the lower reserve
requirement applicable to coun-
try members, while some small
banks in major financial centers
had to carry the higher reserve
requirement imposed on reserve
city members. To end this anach-
ronism, in 1972 the Federal
Reserve introduced reforms so
that all member banks of a given
size, whatever their location,
were subject to identical reserve
requirements.
What about reserve requirements
on nondeposit sources of funds?
Such requirements date back to
the tight-money period of 1969.
In that year, and earlier in 1966,
market rates of interest rose
above the ceiling rates payable
on time deposits under the Fed's
Regulation Q, so that investors
switched their funds out of
deposits into bonds and other
market instruments. But Euro-
dollar borrowings and commer-
cial paper sold by bank-holding
companies provided avenues
through which banks could bid
for funds to offset deposit out-
flows, since they had never been
subject to Reg Q ceilings. Con-
sequently, in 1969 the Federal
Reserve imposed reserve require-
ments on additions to Euro-
dollars, and in 1970 it imposed
requirements on bank-related
commercial paper, in order to
close off those sources of loan-
able funds and thereby slow the
expansion of bank credit. For
similar anti-inflationary reasons,
the Fed last year imposed mar-
ginal reserve requirements on
increases in funds obtained
through CD's or holding-com-
pany paper.What types of reserve require-
ments are imposed on non-
member banks?
State-chartered nonmember
banks must abide by the regula-
tions oftheir respective states
with regard to reserves. Since
each state authority sets its own
rules, there are actually 50 sets
of reserve requirements in addi-
tion to that of the Federal Reserve
System. (FederaI deposit-insur-
ance legislation in 1933 in effect
imposed uniform reserve require-
ments through uniform System
membership, but this provision
was later repealed.) Most states
have reserve-requirement per-
centages nominally similar to the
Fed's; demand-deposit require-
ments in 33 states are equal to (or
greater than) those the Fed
imposes on a medium-to-large
bank. However, nonmember
banks oftp.n have more options
than member banks in meeting
reserve requirements, and these
options tend to lessen or even
eliminate their cost burdens.
Nonmembers hold a greater
percentage of their assets in a
form that earns interest or buys
services; some states permit
holdings of U.S. Treasury or
municipal securities to count as
reserves, and most states permit
use of demand balances at city
correspondents, whether or not
the deposited funds have been
actually collected. Thus, non-
members can obtain a competi-
tive edge over member banks
and can be inherently more
profitable.
How do member and non-
member requirements compare
in this District?
In four District states (California,
Nevada, Utah and Washington)
state reserve-requirement ratios
on demand and time deposits are
almost identical to those of mem-
ber banks. (In these and other
statp.s, of course, state nonmem-
ber banks have more options
than member banks concerning
the form in which reserves may
be held.) In three states (Arizona,
Hawaii and Oregon) state reserve
requirements on demand de-
posits are generally lower. Ari-
zona and Oregon also maintain
a 4-percent rate on all savings-
and-time deposits, versus 3-per-
cent and 5-percent rates,
respectively, for member banks.
Alaska's state requirements are
higher for both demand and time
deposits. Idaho generally main-
tains higher reserve requirements
against demand deposits.
What types of reserve require-
ments are imposed on thrift
institutions?
The Federal Home Loan Bank
System, which covers about
three-fourths of all savings-and-
loan associations, imposes a
reserve requirement on its mem-
bers. State-chartered S&L's in 16
states, and state-chartered
mutual-savings banks in 8 states,
also are governed by similar sorts
of requirement. However, the
requirements affecting thrift insti-
tutions are designed solely to
further institutional liquidity, and
generally take the form of cash,
deposits with banks, and govern-
ment securities. Since a rigid
reserve requirement provides
virtually no usable liquidity, the
Home Loan Bank Board tends to
vary the ratio according to condi-
tions, lowering it in periods of
tight money and increasing it
when easier credit conditions
prevail. Thrift institutions' liquid-
ity reserves generally equal or
exceed the Fed's reserve-require-
ment ratios on time deposits,
although again, there are differ-
ences concerning the form in
which reserves may be held.
How does the U.S. differ from
foreign countries in its reserve
requirements?
The United States was the first
country to formalize the tradi-
tional cash reserves of commer-
cial banks into a set of legally
required reserve ratios. Today,
however, the U.S. is the only
major industrial country that
splits the responsibility for setting
reserve requirements between
the central bank and regional
23banking authorities. It is the only
major country that does not grant
the central bank the power to
regulate reserves of nonbank
depository institutions, even
though most savings and other
time deposits are kept with such
institutions. In addition, no other
major country makes central-
bank affiliation-and compliance
with its reserve regulations-
voluntary for a significant part of
the commercial-banking commu-
nity.
How have reserve requirements
evolved abroad?
Legal reserve requirements did
not become part of most foreign-
banking legislation until World
War II and the early postwar
years. Some leading countries,
such as Great Britain and France,
introduced reserve requirements
only a few years ago; in fact, the
Bank of England continues to rely
on voluntary compliance with the
ratios it sets. However, those two
countries have used reserve ratios
decisively in recent years to deal
with inflationary pressures. In
Germany, reserve requirements
have become a main tool of
monetary control in the past
several decades.
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What has been the recent
foreign experience?
Major foreign countries, like the
U.S., have recently experienced
changes in financial structure and
in the channels of credit flows,
as well as in the scope of activity
of various credit-granting institu-
tions. These changes have re-
sulted in successive extensions in
the range of liabilities and in the
range of institutions subject to
reserve requirements. Over time,
reserve requirements have been
imposed on additional types of
institutions that begin to accept
deposits or that become impor-
tant factors in the short-term
credit market. Moreover, some
countries which typically gain
nonresident deposits during
international crises have imposed
higher reserve ratios (sometimes




What is the basic function of
reserve requirements?
The basic function is not to
ensure bank liquidity, but rather
to permit the Federal Reserve to
control the supply of money and
credit in pursuit of its basic
economic-policy goals. Reserve
requirements provide a known
and controllable base through
which the reserve-supplying and
reserve-absorbing actions of the
Federal Reserve can affect the
supply of money and credit. This
mechanism operates through the
Federal Reserve's control over
the percentage of deposits that
must be held as reserves, in the
form of either vault cash or
balances at Reserve Banks, and
through its influence (via open-
market operations) over the total
amount of member-bank
deposits.
How do changes in reserve
requirements tend to operate?
The Federal Reserve's control
over the level of total deposits is
exercised predominantly through
its open-market purchases and
sales of government securities.
Open-market operations create
or destroy reserves, and in a
fractional-reserve system, these
actions in turn cause a multiple
expansion or contraction of de-
posits, based on the reciprocal
of the required deposit ratio. But,
in addition} instead of changing
the amount of reserves available
to the banks, the Fed can simply
change the amount of deposits
each dollar of reserves will
permit. This is done} of course,
through changes in reserve re-
quirements. For example, with a
16-percent reserve requirement
(roughly a 6-to-1 ratio) each
dollar of reserve balances permits
the issue of about six dollars indeposits. With a change in the
requirementto 14 percent
(roughly a 7-to-1 ratio) each
reserve dollar permits about
seven deposit dollars, thereby
raising the total deposit limit to
about 7/6 of the former level.
Could reserve requirements play
a larger role?
Some observers have proposed
an increased use of the reserve-
requirement tool, through the
device of frequent small percent-
age changes in such require-
ments. However, the experiment
hasn't been tried because of the
overall effectiveness of open-
market operations for imple-
menting policy objectives.
(Incidentally, the revival of
monetary policy overtwo
decades ago was closely linked
to the availability of the weapon
of open-market operations, since
the public debt was large and
widely distributed and was com-
prised largely of marketable
securities with a wide range of
maturities.) Still, the reserve-
requirement tool has the advan-
tage of permitting monetary
policy to affect the reserve posi-
tion of all banks immediately,
thereby permitting a prompt
change in bank-credit availability.
With uniform reserve require-
ments, this tool could be utilized




The actual use of reserve require-
ments has varied with monetary
conditions and with prevailing
policy views. Some ofthe most
notable episodes were the sharp
(and widely criticized) increase in
requirements in 1936-37to mop
up excess liquidity, the successive
reductions at large banks in 1942
to facilitate bank absorption of
war loans, the modest increases
in 1951 to offset the Korean War's
expansionary impact on bank
credit, followed by gradual re-
ductions from 1953 to 1966 to
meetthe general criticism of the
high level of such requirements.
Increases in 1968, -1969 and 1973
were made in an effort to curb
inflationary pressures.
Are differential requirements
valid, as between demand and
time deposits?
Demand deposits are part of the
money supply and are close y
associated with the volume of
spending, and fluctuations in
such deposits are generally pre-
sumed to have a greater impact
on economic stability than
fluctuations in time deposits.
Differential requirements thus
serve to neutralize somewhat the
impact on economic activity of
shifts between demand and time
deposits.
Should reserve requirements be
maintained at all on time
deposits?
The answer depends on one's
viewpoint regarding the crucial
monetary aggregate: M" defined
as demand deposits (other than
U.S. Government and domestic
interbank deposits) plus'the non-
bank public's currency holdings;
M 2, definedas M] plus commer-
cial bank time deposits (other
than large CD's); or M o, defined
as M 2 plus thrift institution de-
posits. The M] advocates feel that
the monetary authorities need
control only demand deposits.
The M" advocates believe that the
leve! required against bank time-
and-savings deposits should be
very close to that imposed on
demand deposits. The M, advo-
cates believe that thrift institu-
tions should be subject to the
same requirements as banks-
certainly so ifthey should begin
to offer demand-deposit liabili-
ties. The Fed's view is that some
reserve requirement on at least
bank time deposits is appropriate,
since these deposits are a partial
substitute for money and an im-
portant source of loanable funds.
However, if changes in time-and-
savings deposits are small or
easily predictable, then the
matter is relatively unimportant




What i the basic principle
underlying the Fed's proposal?
The principle is that equivalent
cash reserve requirements should
apply to all deposits that effec-
tively serve as part of the public's
money balances.
What are the two major issues
involved in this controversy?
The first is the need to provide a
more equitable system of reserve
requirements for financial insti-
utions offering similar deposit
services. The second is the need
to facilitate the management of
monetary policy by sharpening
one of the principal policy tools.
Why is the present system
inequitable?
The inequity lies in the differen-
tial cost burdens associated with
the types of assets that may be
counted as reserves by the
various types of banks. Member
banks must maintain their re-
serves in the form of either vault
cash or deposit balances at
Federal Reserve Banks. Nonmem-
ber banks have more options in
meeting their reserve require-
ments, and these options tend to
lessen or even eliminate their
cost burden. For example, 10
states permit use of interest-bear-
ing U.S. Treasury or municipal
securities, and 45 states permit
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use of demand balances at city
correspondents, to meet at least
part of nonmember-bank reserve
requirements. (State laws allow
uncollected balances to be
counted as legal reserves, and
these balances alone amount to
about 8 percent of demand de-
posits, or roughly half of average
reserve requirements.) Because
nonmembers hold a greater per-
centage of their assets ina form
that earns interest or buys
services, they have a competitive
edge over member banks and
thus can be inherently more
profitable.
Why does the present system
complicate monetary-policy
formulation?
To achieve good management
over the supply of money and
credit, reserve requirements must
be met by holding assets which
are outside the payments stream
and whose aggregate volume is
under Federal Reserve control.
Reserve requirements set by the
various states do not meet this
test. Nonmember-bank holdings
of interest-bearing securities or
of deposits with other banks fail
to contribute to the monetary-.
policy function of reserves, since
the funds so used remain avail-
able to finance additional deposit
and credit expansion. When a
nonmember bank satisfies all or
part of its state reserve require-
ment by holding deposits at a
member bank, that member bank
naturally is required to hold cash
reserves against these deposits at
a Federal Reserve Bank or in its
own bank vault. But in this case,
the size of the member bank's
cash reserve is quite small relative
to the initial deposit at the non-
member. Consequently, the task
of monetary control is compli-
cated by the minor degree to
which nonmember deposits are
indirectly backed by reserves
that satisfy Federal Reserve re-
serve requirements.
Could a shift toward nonmember
banks further complicate the
problem?
Shifts in deposits between mem-
ber banks and nonmembers alter
the relationship between reserves
under Federal Reserve control
and the nation's deposits. During
an inflationary period, for ex-
ample, the Fed generally attempts
to restrain monetary growth by
providing bank reserves at a
reduced pace. However, its
efforts may be offset if the public
is at the same time shifting
deposits into nonmember banks,
thereby leading to a faster growth
of deposits and the money supply
than wouId be expected from the
slower growth of member-bank
reserves. Deposits at nonmember
institutions require less cash re-
serves than at member banks, sothat the total of deposits that
would be supported by the avail-
able total of cash reserves would
be enlarged.
Has a shift of this type actually
occurred?
The nonmember-bank propor-
tion of demand deposits has been
rising over the past decade and
a half, from 17 percent of the
total in 1960 to about 25 percent
of the total in 1973. This has come
about because of a 164-percent
increase in the demand-deposit
component of the money supply
held at nonmember banks, com-
pared with a 61-percent growth
at member banks. Also, deposit
growth at nonmembers has
shown more year-to-year fluctua-
tions than at member banks, thus
compounding the difficulties of
monetary control under the pre-
vailing deposit structure (see
chart). In terms of numbers of
banks, about 750 banks have left
the Federal Reserve System
through withdrawal or mergers
since 1960, while less than 100 of
the roughly 1,850 newly chart-
ered state banks have elected to
join the System over that period.
What accounts for the rapid
growth of the nonmembers?
This trend partially reflects the
rapid population growth in
regions of the country served by
nonmember banks. But a major
causal factor is the competitive
disadvantage imposed on mem-
ber banks by being required to
hold reserves as vault cash or as
deposits at the Federal Reserve
Bank. Banks must forego earning
assets to build up a reserve
balance at the Federal Reserve.
That reserve balance pays no
interest, although member banks
do receive some services from
the Federal Reserve.
Why does the present system
hamper the use of the reserve-
requirement tool?
The Federal Reserve must use
changes in reserve requirements
sparingly as an instrument of
monetary policy, since an in-
crease in requirements would
worsen the competitive disad-
vantage of member banks and
thereby threaten a further erosion
of membership. This inhibition
has been unfortunate, for there
have been times when the
prompt and pervasive impact of
a higher reserve requirement
would have been the best way to
signal a policy move toward
added restraint on credit avail-
ability.
Have reserve requirements
actually been raised during
inflation periods?
Twice during the late 1960's, this
weapon was utilized as an anti-
inflationary move. Again, last
year, the System raised require-
ments on demand and certain
time deposits, and also appealed
to nonmember banks to coop-
erate by voluntarily increasing
reserves in a like amount. The
three increases in demand-
deposit requirements over the
past half-decade-V2 percentage
point each time-have brought
the requirement for the largest
banks to 18 percent. Given the
severity of the inflation, however,
requirements for large money-
center banks might have been
raised more frequently, or
brought closer to the 22-percent
maximum, if there had been no
constraints on Federal Reserve
actions in this area (see chart).
Why does the present system
hamper the precision of policy
formulation?
Monetary-policy formulation is
based increasingly on such key
monetary aggregates as the M,
money supply, yet the lack of
current nonmember-bank data
makes it impossible to obtain a
precise measure of this keystatis-
tical series. The latest revision,
which changed the 1973 growth




Should reserve requirements be
extended to certain thrift-institu-
tion deposits?
Mutual-savings banks in New
Hampshire and Massachusetts
offer depositors interest-earning
accounts subject to a "negotiable
order of withdrawal"-in effect,
an interest-bearing checking
account. Savings-and-Ioan asso-
ciations in California are attempt-
ing to enter the electronic
money-transfer system operated
by the California Automated
Clearing House. These innova-
tions probably represent the first
step toward what ultimately will
become a single, integrated na-
tionwide payments system-and
they raise the question of how
cent, was caused mostly by the
largest nonmember benchmark
adjustment in the history of the
series. (This factor alone added
$2.8 billion to the level of M, for
both june and October bench-
mark dates.) There are only
infrequent single-day observa-
tions, two to four times a year, of
nonmember-bank deposit data.
But demand deposits are highly
volatile, especially on a day-by-
day basis, so that money-supply
measures can be distorted by
single-day relationships between
member and nonmember banks.
The situation is complicated by
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Nonmember-bank proportion of total demand deposits
rises from 17 to 25 percent since 1960
Annual Growth {Percent}
15r-----------------------------
28the costs of such a system can be
equitably distributed among all
the institutions involved. Ifthrift
institutions develop extensive
checking powers and become
part of the newly emerging pay-
ments mechanism without as-
suming a proportional share of
the costs, the present member-
nonmember inequities would
only be increased.
Should uniform requirements be
imposed on bank and nonbank
time deposits?
From the viewpoint of equity, a
case can be made for uniform
reserve requirements on time-
and-savings deposits at all
financial institutions. At the same
time, it should be remembered
that the diversified services
offered by commercial banks
give them an advantage in bid-
ding for such deposits, even after
taking into account their costs of
holding cash reserves. Given the
continuation of recent trends,
however, the increasing provision
of money-transfer services by
nonbank thrift institutions will
blur the distinction between the
two sets of institutions, just as it
blurs the distinction between
checking and savings accounts.
As nonbank institutions become
more like commercial banks, the
basis for difference in reserve re-
quirements will be weakened.
Opposition to Federal
Reserve Proposal
What are some of the major
sources of opposition to the
proposa?
Nonmember banks and financial
institutions tend to oppose the
proposal, because they would
lose their present competitive
advantage if forced to operate
under Federal Reserve require-
ments. Some member banks also
are doubtful, because they a~e
afraid of losing a considerable
volume of correspondent-bank
balances. In addition, some finan-
cial institutions and regulatory
authorities are afraid that the
proposal would lead to universal
Federal Reserve membership,
although the Fed categorically




Is the proposal unnecessary from
the standpoint of monetary-
policy formulation?
Opponents frequently quote a
statement by Federal Reserve
Governor Mitchell, to the effect
that reserve requirements are a
"desirable and convenient, but
not absolutely indispensable"
tool of monetary control. This
statement supports the idely
accepted view that the Federal
Reserve can influence monetary
aggregates and bank credit
sufficiently by relying solely on
open-market operations and the
discou t wi do . But the rest of
Governor Mitchell's statement,
which opponents generally ig-
nore, states, "to do so would
place a heavier burden on finan-
cial markets, and would forfeit
the advantages of immediacy and
pervasivetless inhere t in a gen-
eral change in reserve require-
ments." Moreover, the reporting
aspects attendant to the Fed's
proposal will ensure the avail-
ability of more precise monetary
statistics.
On equity grounds, should re-
serve requirements be eliminated
completely?
From the standpoint ofequity-
that is, equal treatment of all
financial instit tions-t e same
result could be achieved by im-
posing uniform reserve require-
ments or by eliminating require-
ments completely. Proponents of
the latter view argue that reserve
requirements act as a tax-like
penalty on bank earni gs, and
thus should be discarded. How-
ever, elimination of this "tax"
would result in an inordinate
increase in the level of bank
profits and a consequent windfall
gain to bank stockholders, which
could be difficult to defe d.
29Percent
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On equity grounds, should
interest be paid on required
reserves?
Since reserve requirements are,
in effect, an excise tax which
currently discriminates among
institutions, a case can be made
for paying some interest return
on required reserves as a means
of offsetting this "tax." The al-
ternative, however, is to end the
discrimination by extending the
scope of the "tax" through uni-
form reserve requirements.
Adoption of this alternative
approach appears more urgent
because of the strength of the
Fed's arguments for uniform re-
quirements. Moreover, if banks
did receive an interest return on
their required reserves, they
could then be called upon (on
grounds of symmetry) to pay
interest themselves on their
Treasury tax-and-Ioan accounts
and even on their demand
deposits.
Wo Id the proposal destroy the
dual-banking system?
Opponents of the proposal claim
'that it would erode or even
destroy the dual-banking system
of state and national supervision.
This is the system which, in the
words of the Conference of State
Banking Supervisors, "stimulates
banks to meet local needs
through its contribution to bank
'73 '70 '65 '60
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Problem of member-bank erosion tends to restrain Fed
from raising reserve requirements during recent inflation
o '45 '50 '55
•Central Reserve City prior to 1962
Annual Change (Percent)
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30flexibility and its innovative
qualities in a constantly changing
economy." It is alleged that state
nonmember banks are hampered
by state laws and regulations,
which tend to offset their cost
advantage stemming from easier
reserve requirements, and that
loss of this cost advantage would
induce them to switch from state
to national charters. State-
chartered nonmember banks are
supervised by state banking
authorities and the FDIC; nation-
ally-chartered banks must be
members of the Federal Reserve
System, and they are regulated by
the Comptroller of the Currency.
Thus, it is argued that a wholesale
shift from state to national char-
ters could lead to the demise of
the dual-banking system. In
rebuttal, it should be noted that
the proposed legislation exempts
most small banks, which are pre-
dominantly nonmembers, from
uniform reserve requirements.
The exemption of institutions
with $2 million or less in net
demand deposits and/or NOW
accounts frees 62 percent of
present nonmember banks-over
5,000 banks-from reserve re-
quirements in excess of existing
vault cash holdings.
Would the proposal destroy
correspondent-banking relation-
ships?
Opponents of the proposal point
out that if nonmember banks
were required to place reserves
with the Fed, funds would be
transferred by nonmembers from
their correspondent accounts to
Federal Reserve Banks. Since
member banks' demand-deposit
balances with their correspond-
ents amount to relatively only
half as much as nonmember-bank
balances, compliance with the
Fed's proposal could lead cor-
respondent banks to lose perhaps
half of their present $10 billion
in nonmember accounts, accord-
ing to the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors. A reduction of
correspondent balances of this
magnitude would sharply reduce
profits derived from providing
correspondent services, and
would thus curtail the availability
of such services and compel
banks generally to rely on the
Fed for an increasing proportion
of correspondent-type services.
In rebuttal, it should be noted
that correspondent banks have
consistently maintained profit-
able relationships with member
banks as well as nonmembers.
They could perhaps lose some
business under the Fed's pro-
posal, but in view of the exemp-
tion provision, certainly nothing
of the magnitude suggested
above. In particular, large cor-
respondent banks furnish services
-portfolio analysis and advice,
assistance in international trans-
actions, loan participations, and
so on-that Reserve Banks do not
and should not provide.
31